
- Journal of Geographical Sciences
- Vol. 30, Issue 3, 378 (2020)
Abstract
Keywords
1 Introduction
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Household Contract Responsibility System (HCRS) replaced the People’s Commune System, and small-scale household production became the fundamental system underlying China’s agriculture. In that era, China’s household registration system restricted the transfer of the surplus agricultural labor force, and so household income maximization could only be achieved through the maximization of land output (
Although the HCRS was highly successful, it also resulted in tiny and fragmented farms. According to HCRS, village collective land was equally distributed to every villager. Given the abundant population and limited collective land, the land allotted to each family was very limited. Moreover, agricultural land differed from parcel to parcel in terms of location and fertility. Thus, the total land holding of each family was not only small but also fragmented and scattered (
This fragmented structure of family farming remained largely unchanged and unchallenged until now. The Fixed Rural Observation Villages system showed that in 2009, the average cultivated area per household was 0.47 ha (7.12 mu) and was fragmented into 4.1 plots. Each plot averaged only 0.11 ha (1.7 mu) (
Although fragmentation may have beneficial effects by reducing risk through the spatial dispersion of plots and crop diversity (
For small rural farmers, scattered tiny parcels increase not only fuel inputs and labor hours for commuting but also the application of fertilizers and pesticides, most likely due to the substitution effects from labor (
China’s central government noted the shortcomings of land fragmentation as early as the initial stage of the reform and opening-up. The Chinese No 1 Central Document early in 1984 encouraged land transfer. Opinions issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council in November 2014 on speeding up the circulation of rural land management rights in an orderly fashion and developing optimum scale management indicated that farmers with a land area equivalent to 10 to 15 times the local average and agricultural income equivalent to local nonfarm income should be given priority support. The Chinese No 1 Central Document of 2015 reiterated that the government would guide the orderly circulation of rural land management rights and encourage the development of optimum-scale family farms.
Although the government encourages land circulation and optimum-scale management, the land rental market is only just beginning in China, and it varies greatly by region (
From a macro perspective, land circulation concerns the future of agriculture and even affects the food security and social stability of China; from a micro perspective, land circulation changes farmers’ livelihoods and might produce landless or poor farmers.
Many scholars have conducted empirical research on the driving forces of China’s land rental market from different perspectives (
Previous studies have provided us with a useful understanding of the rural land transfer problem in China. Unfortunately, two main shortcomings exist. (1) Studies are often limited to small geographic areas. At present, there are obvious regional differences in the development of China’s land transfer market, and a nationwide study is required to reflect regional differences. At a global level, a nationwide study of China will also enlighten the development of land rental markets in Ethiopia (
The overall goal of this paper is to explore the impact of off-farm employment on the rural land rental market. To be nationally representative, the data of the 2014 Chinese Household Income Project Survey were used in this paper. The framework of the paper is organized as follows. The second section offers the theoretical framework and analysis of this study; the third section describes the dataset and defines the variables of the study; the fourth and fifth sections develop econometric models and analyze the impact of off-farm income on land circulation; and the final section presents the conclusions of this study.
2 Methodology
2.1 Mechanism of farmers’ non-agricultural income to rural land circulation
The most important factor in measuring non-agricultural employment is non-agricultural income, and there is a positive feedback loop between farmers’ non-agricultural income and rural land circulation (
Figure 1.Figure 1
According to agricultural household models (
Based on the theory of household economics and agricultural household models (
(1) Laborers can choose to dedicate themselves to agricultural or non-agricultural industries without restriction. Initially, the limiting factor of age for the labor force is not considered, and later, the age of the labor force is added to the empirical model as a control variable.
(2) With a decrease in the number of household farming laborers, farmers tend to rent out their farmland. That is, the farmland that can be cultivated is used for unit labor. Initially, the agro-mechanization level and agricultural hired laborers are omitted, and subsequently, these two variables are added to the empirical model as control variables.
(3) Rural land contractual management rights can be transferred freely among households. Farmers can rent out their farmland once they are no longer willing to farm, and those who are willing to farm can lease more farmland for cultivation.
Figure 2.Figure 2
When the per capita non-agricultural income is higher than that of agricultural income, non-agricultural income accounts for a greater proportion of the total household income, according to hypothesis 1. The lack of a household labor force leads to inefficient cultivation following hypothesis 2. Farmers must determine whether they want more farmland to cultivate, and then rural land circulation appears, according to hypothesis 3. This process is consistent with the mechanism of farmers’ non-agricultural income on rural land circulation, mentioned above.
Based on the theoretical inference above, the following two main contentions are proposed. (1) Households whose income is mainly made up of non-agricultural income tend to transfer out rural land, while households whose income comes mainly from farming tend to rent more farmland to expand the scale of their agricultural production. (2) Rural land circulation is caused indirectly by labor force allocation, and the fundamental cause is the more obvious comparative advantage of non-agricultural income over agricultural income, which causes a decline in the importance of land in household income.
2.2 Model selection
The dependent variable is whether a household transfers its farmland. Because this variable is a categorical dichotomous variable, it is inappropriate to use a general linear regression model. To assess the impact of farmers’ non-agricultural employment on rural land circulation, we choose a discrete choice model in consideration of the binary value of land circulation activities. A logit model was selected for our study to analyze the rural land circulation decision-making behavior of farmers. The functional form of the logit model is as follows:
The equations above show the farmland in-transfer logit model and out-transfer logit model, respectively. NON-AGRI-EMPLOYMENTi are the key explanatory variables associated with non-agricultural employment and are the focus of this analysis. The CONTROLi are a series of control variables, which mainly include householder characteristics, household characteristics, farmland management conditions and landform factors. The coefficients α and β are parameters that need to be estimated.
3 Data
3.1 Data specification
The data used in this study come from the Chinese Household Income Project 2013, also known as CHIP2013 dataset. These data were the results from the fifth-round investigation of nationwide income and expenditure information conducted by the CHIP team in 2014, which mainly collected information on income and expenditures for 2013, with the help of the National Natural Science Foundation of China and the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The CHIP team selected 18,948 household samples covering 15 provinces, 126 cities and 234 counties based on a stratified systematic sampling method in Eastern, Central and Western China. A total of 11,013 samples covering rural households in 14 provinces were available for this study. The data contain household characteristics, information on household members, household income and asset information, and land and agricultural management information, among other information.
We eliminated the household samples without farmland and with uncertain and vacant values, resulting in 5,450 effective household samples in our study.
Figure 3.Figure 3
3.2 Variable selection and statistical description
Based on the mechanism analysis, we selected the variables listed in
Type | Variable | Definition | Mean | Standard deviation | Min | Max | Sample size |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Rural land circulation | transfer_out | Land transfer-out (Yes=1; No=0) | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 | 5450 |
transfer_in | Land transfer-in (Yes=1; No=0) | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 | 2536 | |
Non-agricultural employment | naincome_ratio | Proportion of non-agricultural income | 0.57 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 | 5450 |
nalabor_ratio | Proportion of non-agricultural laborers | 0.20 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 | 5450 | |
naasset_ratio | Proportion of non-agricultural fixed operating assets | 0.45 | 0.11 | 0.28 | 0.75 | 5450 | |
Householders’ characteristics | education | Education level (lowest level=1→highest level=8) | 2.73 | 0.91 | 1 | 8 | 5416 |
marriage | Marital status (unmarried=1; married or has been married=0) | 0.01 | 0.11 | 0 | 1 | 5450 | |
Households’ characteristics | aver_age | Average age of household labor | 46.00 | 11.87 | 21.5 | 93 | 5450 |
cadre | Village cadres in households (Yes=1; No=0) | 0.06 | 0.23 | 0 | 1 | 5434 | |
forest | Grain for Green Project (Yes=1; No=0) | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | 5450 | |
organization | Agricultural cooperative economic organization (Yes=1; No=0) | 0.03 | 0.18 | 0 | 1 | 5450 | |
Households’ characteristics | requisition | Land requisition (Yes=1; No=0) | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 | 5450 |
Land management | pcland | Per capita area of farmland (mu/person) (1 mu=1/15 ha) | 1.89 | 2.16 | 0.08 | 12.5 | 5450 |
Economic level | pcgdp | The logarithm values of per capita GDP of provinces (yuan/person) | 10.65 | 0.34 | 10.10 | 11.44 | 5450 |
Landform condition | landforms | Landforms (plain=1; mountainous area=0) | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 5450 |
Regional dummy variables | east | Eastern China =1; other areas=0 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 | 5450 |
central | Central China =1; other areas=0 | 0.43 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 | 5450 | |
west | Western China =1; other areas=0 | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 | 5450 |
Table 1.
Variable definition and statistical description
We selected 11 factors as control variables in our models. Most of the householders bear the role of the household decision maker, and their ability to be engaged in migrant work is limited to their education level, which also affects the decision-making around household production. Marital status was selected as a factor in our study. According to
Province | Beijing | Liaoning | Jiangsu | Shandong | Guangdong | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Eastern China | Land transfer-out rate | 27.88 | 3.19 | 21.24 | 5.43 | 14.51 |
Land transfer-in rate | 9.85 | 20.74 | 14.93 | 29.23 | 55.21 | |
Proportion of non-agricultural income | 66.25 | 47.82 | 73.23 | 58.99 | 77.41 | |
Proportion of non-agricultural laborers | 22.74 | 14.58 | 17.07 | 16.92 | 22.49 | |
Proportion of non-agricultural fixed operating assets | 47.32 | 42.01 | 47.57 | 43.77 | 48.94 | |
Central China | Province | Shanxi | Anhui | Henan | Hubei | Hunan |
Land transfer-out rate | 7.55 | 17.17 | 6.14 | 6.79 | 9.11 | |
Land transfer-in rate | 10.58 | 29.86 | 9.21 | 25.07 | 31.28 | |
Proportion of non-agricultural income | 52.07 | 59.20 | 65.79 | 56.63 | 70.54 | |
Proportion of non-agricultural laborers | 19.93 | 32.43 | 22.08 | 28.34 | 28.47 | |
Proportion of non-agricultural fixed operating assets | 48.24 | 44.32 | 44.38 | 44.33 | 45.61 | |
Western China | Province | Sichuan | Chongqing | Yunnan | Gansu | - |
Land transfer-out rate | 13.41 | 7.34 | 5.67 | 1.65 | - | |
Land transfer-in rate | 10.97 | 13.81 | 10.02 | 10.06 | - | |
Proportion of non-agricultural income | 67.81 | 72.91 | 58.49 | 59.18 | - | |
Proportion of non-agricultural laborers | 22.12 | 25.00 | 16.93 | 23.09 | - | |
Proportion of non-agricultural fixed operating assets | 43.34 | 44.33 | 44.67 | 39.11 | - |
Table 2.
Land transfer rate and farmers’ non-agricultural employment in different provinces in 2013 (%)
According to the previous analysis, households with more involvement in non-agricultural industries may be more inclined to transfer out farmland, whereas households with more involvement in agricultural industries tend to transfer in more farmland. We define households whose non-agricultural income (agricultural income) accounts for more than 50% of the total household income as a non-agricultural income-based household (agricultural income-based household); those whose non-agricultural labor (agricultural labor) accounts for more than 50% of the total household labor force as a non-agricultural labor-predominant household (agricultural labor-predominant household); and those whose non-agricultural assets (agricultural assets) account for more than 50% of the total household assets as a non-agricultural assets-predominant household (agricultural assets-predominant household). The relationship between the land transfer rate and the degree of family non-agricultural employment in each province is shown in Figures 4 and 5. The results show that at present, the proportion of non-agricultural household income has reached a high level. Except for Liaoning, more than half of the sample households in other provinces are non-agricultural income-based households, and more than 70% of households in Guangdong, Chongqing and Sichuan are supported mainly by non-agricultural income. The provinces with more agricultural income-based households have relatively high land transfer-in rates, especially in Western China. Families with non-agricultural assets as their main assets have relatively high land transfer-out rates, especially in Western and Eastern China. Whether the family non-agricultural labor force is dominant does not well explain the spatial distribution of the land transfer rate.
Figure 4.Figure 4
Figure 5.Figure 5
4 Results
Non-agricultural employment affects households’ land transfer-out decisions, as expected. We conducted the empirical analysis using a logit model to estimate the impact of farmers’ non-agricultural income on land transfer-out and land transfer-in behaviors. The selection of independent variables involved comprehensive aspects to avoid omitted variable bias. Furthermore, all variables passed the multiple collinear tests; thus, there is no serious multicollinearity problem between variables. The statistical analyses were conducted using STATA 13.0.
4.1 Analysis of the impact of non-agricultural income on households’ land transfer-out behaviors
To test the suitability and accuracy of the model, we used the likelihood ratio index McFadden’s R2 and AUC (area under curve) index. The higher the McFadden’s R2 and AUC index, the better the goodness-of-fit. The McFadden’s R2 index of the models below are all greater than 11%, and the AUC are all greater than 0.73, which indicates that the premise of the model is reasonable, and its results are believable. We also complete the robustness tests by adding and removing variables to confirm whether the impact direction and significance are stable. We eliminate various factors of householders’ and households’ characteristics in model 2 and compare the results with model 1. The results of the robustness test show that the four modeling results are identical; the logit model has high feasibility for land transfer-out decision modeling. Models east, central, and west are the results for the samples in Eastern, Central and Western China, respectively. The modeling results are summarized in
Variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model east | Model central | Model west | ||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | ||||||||||
naincome_ratio | 0.617*** | 0.090*** | 0.598*** | 0.088*** | 0.293 | 0.045 | 0.934*** | 0.134*** | 0.872** | 0.106** | |||||||||
(0.122) | (0.018) | (0.122) | (0.018) | (0.196) | (0.030) | (0.184) | (0.026) | (0.346) | (0.042) | ||||||||||
nalaborratio | 0.222 | 0.032 | 0.217 | 0.032 | -0.519** | -0.080** | 0.589** | 0.085** | 0.673* | 0.082* | |||||||||
(0.154) | (0.022) | (0.153) | (0.022) | (0.265) | (0.041) | (0.231) | (0.033) | (0.361) | (0.044) | ||||||||||
naassetratio | 4.721*** | 0.689*** | 4.761*** | 0.697*** | 4.728*** | 0.729*** | 4.999*** | 0.720*** | 3.871*** | 0.472*** | |||||||||
(0.358) | (0.050) | (0.356) | (0.049) | (0.582) | (0.085) | (0.575) | (0.079) | (0.791) | (0.092) | ||||||||||
education | 0.164*** | 0.024*** | 0.154*** | 0.023*** | 0.254*** | 0.039*** | 0.085 | 0.012 | 0.216** | 0.026** | |||||||||
(0.040) | (0.006) | (0.039) | (0.006) | (0.064) | (0.010) | (0.065) | (0.009) | (0.092) | (0.011) | ||||||||||
marriage | -0.145 | -0.021 | -1.343* | -0.207* | -0.118 | -0.017 | 1.214* | 0.148* | |||||||||||
(0.312) | (0.045) | (0.764) | (0.118) | (0.427) | (0.061) | (0.698) | (0.085) | ||||||||||||
average | 0.037*** | 0.005*** | 0.037*** | 0.005*** | 0.035*** | 0.005*** | 0.041*** | 0.006*** | 0.027*** | 0.003*** | |||||||||
(0.004) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.001) | (0.010) | (0.001) | ||||||||||
cadre | -0.149 | -0.022 | -0.104 | -0.016 | 0.018 | 0.003 | -0.481 | -0.059 | |||||||||||
(0.167) | (0.024) | (0.266) | (0.041) | (0.258) | (0.037) | (0.414) | (0.050) | ||||||||||||
forest | -0.229* | -0.033* | -0.215* | -0.031* | -0.180 | -0.028 | -0.196 | -0.028 | -0.407** | -0.050** | |||||||||
(0.119) | (0.017) | (0.118) | (0.017) | (0.319) | (0.049) | (0.175) | (0.025) | (0.202) | (0.024) | ||||||||||
organization | 0.437** | 0.064** | 0.431** | 0.063** | -0.110 | -0.017 | 0.851** | 0.123** | 0.746** | 0.091** | |||||||||
(0.194) | (0.028) | (0.194) | (0.028) | (0.338) | (0.052) | (0.337) | (0.048) | (0.363) | (0.044) | ||||||||||
requisition | 0.074 | 0.011 | -0.204 | -0.032 | 0.034 | 0.005 | 0.357 | 0.044 | |||||||||||
(0.111) | (0.016) | (0.181) | (0.028) | (0.188) | (0.027) | (0.236) | (0.029) | ||||||||||||
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model east | Model central | Model west | |||||||||||||||
Variable | Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal effects | Coefficient | Marginal | ||||||||||
pcland | -0.346*** | -0.050*** | -0.352*** | -0.052*** | -0.357*** -0.055*** | -0.238*** | -0.034*** | -0.945*** - | -0.115*** | ||||||||||
(0.034) | (0.005) | (0.034) | (0.005) | (0.054) (0.008) | (0.044) | (0.006) | (0.132) | (0.015) | |||||||||||
pcgdp | 0.363 | 0.053 | 0.362 | 0.053 | 1.359*** 0.210*** | -1.420* | -0.204* | -0.235 | -0.029 | ||||||||||
(0.257) | (0.037) | (0.256) | (0.038) | (0.407) (0.062) | (0.860) | (0.124) | (0.417) | (0.051) | |||||||||||
landforms | -0.264** | -0.039** | -0.260** | -0.038** | omitted | -0.497*** | -0.072*** | omitted | |||||||||||
(0.116) | (0.017) | (0.115) | (0.017) | (0.161) | (0.023) | ||||||||||||||
east | -0.059 | -0.009 | -0.065 | -0.010 | |||||||||||||||
(0.269) | (0.039) | (0.268) | (0.039) | ||||||||||||||||
central | -0.026 | -0.004 | -0.033 | -0.005 | |||||||||||||||
(0.125) | (0.018) | (0.124) | (0.018) | ||||||||||||||||
Constant | -9.328*** | -9.265*** | -20.452*** | 8.908 | -2.173 | ||||||||||||||
(2.650) | (2.643) | (4.484) | (9.078) | (4.290) | |||||||||||||||
0.118 | 0.118 | 0.127 | 0.1058 | 0.2053 | |||||||||||||||
0.739 | 0.739 | 0.742 | 0.728 | 0.811 | |||||||||||||||
5400 | 5416 | 1940 | 2330 | 1130 |
Table 3.
The impact of non-agricultural employment on farmers5 land transfer-out behavior in China, Eastern China, Central China and Western China in 2013
For the non-agricultural employment factors, the proportion of non-agricultural income and the proportion of non-agricultural fixed operating assets have a significant positive impact on the farmers’ land transfer-out decision at the 1% significance level, and the proportion of non-agricultural laborers is significant at the 15% level. As posited in our theoretical analysis, households with a larger proportion of non-agricultural income were disposed to transfer out their farmland. Agricultural income occupied only a small fraction of the total household income and was not sufficient to offset household expenses. This phenomenon caused a decline in the importance of farmland and an increase in the attractiveness of non-agricultural employment. The non-agricultural fixed operating assets reflected farmers’ investment in non-agricultural industry; the higher the proportion of non-agricultural fixed operating assets was, the lower the proportion of agricultural fixed operating assets, and the lower the degree of attention to agriculture. The proportion of non-agricultural laborers is not as significant as expected but has indirect effects on the land transfer-out decision. The definition of non-agricultural laborers is based on whether an individual migrated for work in 2013. As there are short-term and long-term migrant workers, the migratory household members may change roles; thus, there is uncertainty in the results from these data. From the perspective of regional differences, because of the high level of non-agricultural income in Eastern China, the land transfer-out rate in the Eastern region is mainly affected by the proportion of non-agricultural labor and non-agricultural assets. Of these, the influence of the proportion of non-agricultural labor is negative, which may be due to the small per capita arable land area in the Eastern region and the limited number of laborers needed to manage their contracted farmland.For the factors concerning householder characteristics, education level has a significant positive effect on the land transfer-out decision, especially in Eastern and Western China. Householders with a higher education level are more willing to make the decision to transfer out their land. Marital status has no obvious impact on the land transfer-out decision, which is different from the result of
4.2 Analysis of the impact of non-agricultural income on households’ land transfer-in behaviors
The modeling of farmers’ land transfer-in behavior is also a type of robustness test. If the households that treat agricultural income as the main source of household income tend to rent more farmland to increase their revenues, this also confirms the robustness of the above model, which says that a household engaged in non-agricultural work is not willing to cultivate more farmland. We again used the likelihood ratio index McFadden’s R2 and the AUC index to test the suitability and accuracy of the model. The McFadden’s R2 index of the models below are all greater than 15%, and the AUC are all greater than 0.75, which indicates that the goodness-of-fit is high and the results are convincing. We also complete the robust test by adding and removing variables, and the results show that the modeling results are robust; the logit model has high feasibility for land transfer-in decision modeling. We also create three other models using the samples in the Eastern, Central and Western regions. The modeling results are summarized in
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model east | Model central | Model west | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | |||
naincome ratio | —0.414*** | -0.071*** | -0.411** | -0.071** | -0.346 | -0.047 | -0.222 | -0.041 | -0.939** | -0.197** | |||
(0.161) | (0.028) | (0.161) | (0.028) | (0.275) | (0.037) | (0.242) | (0.0440 | (0.431) | (0.088) | ||||
nalabor ratio | -0.231 | -0.040 | -0.234 | -0.040 | 0.434 | 0.059 | -0.413 | -0.076 | -1.133** | -0.238** | |||
(0.223) | (0.038) | (0.222) | (0.038) | (0.376) | (0.051) | (0.343) | (0.063) | (0.521) | (0.107) | ||||
naasset_ratio | -1.057** | -0.182** | -1.090** | -0.188** | -1.492* | -0.202* | 0.009 | 0.002 | -2.944** | -0.618** | |||
(0.469) | (0.081) | (0.469) | (0.081) | (0.765) | (0.103) | (0.754) | (0.138) | (1.175) | (0.239) | ||||
education | -0.143** | -0.025** | -0.142** | -0.024** | -0.156 | -0.021 | -0.240** | -0.044** | -0.009 | -0.002 | |||
marriage | (0.060) | (0.010) | (0.060) | (0.010) | (0.100) | (0.014) | (0.097) | (0.018) | (0.136) | (0.029) | |||
aver_age | -0.030*** | -0.005*** | -0.030*** | -0.005*** | -0.031*** | -0.004*** | -0.026*** | -0.005*** | -0.037** | -0.008** | |||
(0.005) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.001) | (0.008) | (0.001) | (0.007) | (0.001) | (0.015) | (0.003) | ||||
cadre | 0.467** | 0.081** | 0.477** | 0.082** | 0.807** | 0.109** | 0.031 | 0.006 | 0.906* | 0.190* | |||
forest | (0.202) | (0.035) | (0.202) | (0.035) | (0.323) | (0.043) | (0.318) | (0.058) | (0.503) | (0.104) | |||
organization | 1.035*** | 0.178*** | 1.028*** | 0.177*** | 1.701*** | 0.231*** | 0.326 | 0.060 | 1.407** | 0.295** | |||
requisition | (0.238) | (0.040) | (0.237) | (0.040) | (0.347) | (0.046) | (0.446) | (0.082) | (0.563) | (0.115) | |||
Model | 1 | Model 2 | Model east | Model central | Model west | ||||||||
Variable | Coefficient | Marginal | Marginal | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | Coefficient | Marginal | |||||
effects | effects | effects | effects | effects | |||||||||
0.310*** | 0.053*** | 0.310*** 0.054*** | 0.430*** 0.058*** | 0.293*** | 0.054*** | 0.093 | 0.019 | ||||||
pcland | (0.026) | (0.004) | (0.026) (0.004) | (0.044) (0.005) | (0.045) | (0.008) | (0.064) | (0.013) | |||||
0.713* | 0.123* | 0.743** 0.128** | -2.365*** -0.321*** | 1.717 | 0.315 | 1.901*** | 0.399*** | ||||||
pcgdp | (0.376) | (0.065) | (0.370) (0.064) | (0.724) (0.097) | (1.163) | (0.212) | (0.624) | (0.125) | |||||
-1.113*** -0.192*** | -1.119*** -0.193*** | -1.099*** | -0.201*** | ||||||||||
landforms | (0.160) | (0.027) | (0.159) (0.027) | omitted | (0.213) | (0.037) | omitted | ||||||
-0.047 | -0.008 | -0.087 -0.015 | |||||||||||
east | (0.396) | (0.068) | (0.389) (0.067) | ||||||||||
0.397** | 0.068** | 0.380** 0.066** | |||||||||||
central | (0.183) | (0.031) | (0.180) (0.031) | ||||||||||
-6.154 | -6.430* | 26.356*** | -16.609 | -16.691*** | |||||||||
Constant | (3.860) | (3.798) | (7.949) | (12.277) | (6.421) | ||||||||
0.159 | 0.158 | 0.230 | 0.158 | 0.100 | |||||||||
0.764 | 0.763 | 0.789 | 0.762 | 0.723 | |||||||||
2507 | 2507 | 1154 | 987 | 366 |
Table 4.
The impact of non-agricultural employment on farmers5 land transfer-in behavior in China, Eastern China, Central China and Western China in 2013
For the non-agricultural employment factors, the proportion of non-agricultural income and proportion of non-agricultural fixed operating assets have significant negative impacts on farmers’ land transfer-in decision, while the proportion of non-agricultural laborers has no obvious impact. There is a negative relationship between non-agricultural employment and farmers’ land transfer-in decision. A higher proportion of non-agricultural income indicates less dependence on land and a lower willingness to expand the current scale of farmland. A higher proportion of non-agricultural fixed operating assets reflects lower inputs, attention to agriculture, and willingness to be engaged in agricultural activities. Examining regional differences, in the Eastern region, the proportion of non-agricultural assets has a significant negative impact on the land transfer-in rate. The three selected non-agricultural employment characteristics have no significant impact on the land transfer-in rate in the Central region. In the Western region, the three characteristics of non-agricultural employment have a significant negative impact on the land transfer-in rate.
For the householders’ characteristics, education level has a significant negative effect on the land transfer-in decision, especially in Central China. Because there are some restrictions on the education level for migrant workers, householders with a lower education level are more likely to farm at home; they are thus more willing to make the decision to transfer in land.
Considering households’ characteristics, the average age of household laborers has a significant negative effect on the land transfer-in decision. The higher the laborers’ average age is, the lower the likelihood they will transfer in land. Combined with our statistical description, in households that have transferred in more land, the average age of household laborers is 44.48 years old, and in households that have not transferred in land, the laborers’ average age is 46.20 years old. As we stated above, laborers slightly older than 46.20 are more willing to be engaged in non-agricultural industries. Elderly people are not willing to cultivate their land, let alone to transfer in more land. Additionally, having a village cadre in the household means that household is more likely to learn of land management policies and gain other timely knowledge, so these households tend to transfer in more farmland to maintain their stable life, especially in Eastern and Western China. In addition, if a household has joined the agricultural cooperative economic organization, it tends to have greater enthusiasm for agriculture and to learn more farming techniques and skills from the organization; thus, it is more likely that they will transfer in more land, especially in Eastern and Western China. We also found that, combined with the land transfer-out models, households that have joined an agricultural cooperative economic organization are more likely to both transfer in and transfer out land, which may be because this group of farmers is more enthusiastic about operating and adjusting their land; they adjust their land by transferring in and transferring out land to create better conditions for scale cultivation.
Considering the land management factors, the per capita area of farmland has a significant positive effect on the land transfer-in decision, especially in Eastern and Central China. If the per capita area of farmland is high, the household is more dependent on agriculture, the average area of the land parcel is larger, and the quality is higher, which leads to a high possibility of transferring land.
Looking at the different economic levels in different provinces, per capita GDP has a significant positive effect on the land transfer-in decision. The higher the region’s level of economic development is, the more likely that farmers will transfer in more land, especially in Western China. Similarly, the regional dummy variable representing the Central region of China shows that the number of households that have transferred in farmland is much greater than it is in the Western region of China. For the Eastern region, because the overall level of economic development is higher, as the level of economic development increases, farmers become less likely to transfer in more land.
For the landform condition factors, land transfer in is more likely to occur in mountainous regions. In the analysis of the land transfer-out models above, we found that rural land circulation in mountainous areas is more frequent and common than that in the plains. The agricultural production conditions are poor in mountainous areas; therefore, farmers transfer land to concentrate on flat land and improve production conditions, or they even transfer out their land and migrate to gain greater benefits from non-agricultural industry.
When the proportion of non-agricultural income increases by one unit, the probability of farmers’ deciding to transfer-in land decreases by 0.07. The increase in the non-agricultural income ratio has a stronger effect on the transfer-out decision than it does on the transfer-out decision. In terms of regional differences, there is no significant impact in the Eastern and Central regions, while the probability of decision to transfer in land decreases by 0.20 in the Western region. The probability that a household will transfer in land in the Western region will decrease by 0.24 with a one-unit increase in the proportion of non-agricultural labor. For every unit increase in the proportion of non-agricultural assets, the probability that farmers transfer in land will decrease by 0.18 in all of China, 0.20 in the Eastern region and 0.62 in the Western region. The above results further verify the validity of the two main contentions that we discussed in section 2.1 of this paper.
5 Discussion and conclusions
5.1 Discussion
There is always debate whether an increase in non-agricultural income will promote or reduce farmers’ investment in agriculture, but a reduction is more likely according to this study. From the perspective of the cost and benefit of agricultural production, the profits from agriculture are steadily decreasing.
Figure 6.Figure 6
Because of the slow increase in agricultural income, the attractiveness of agriculture to farmers is less than that of becoming a migrant worker. Households with higher labor opportunity costs are more likely to reduce labor intensity and increase labor-saving inputs in their land use decisions (
Figure 7.Figure 7
5.2 Conclusions
Using the CHIP2013 dataset, we focused on the impact of farmers’ non-agricultural employment on rural land circulation in China. Including the comprehensive consideration of possible influencing factors, the logit model results showed that the proportion of non-agricultural assets has the greatest impact on the decision-making around land transfer, followed by the proportion of non-agricultural income. An increase in the non-agricultural income ratio has a stronger effect on the transfer-out than on the transfer-in decision. In terms of regional differences, for the Eastern region, the decision to transfer out land is mainly affected by the proportion of non-agricultural assets and of the non-agricultural labor force, and the decision to transfer in land is mainly affected by the proportion of non-agricultural assets. In the Central and Western regions, the decision to transfer out land is mainly affected by the proportion of non-agricultural assets, non-agricultural income and the non-agricultural labor force, in that order. The decision to transfer in land in the Central region is not significantly affected by non-agricultural employment. The decision to transfer in land in the Western region is mainly affected by the proportion of non-agricultural assets, the non-agricultural labor force and non-agricultural income, in that order.
Householders’ education level and laborers’ average age play an important role in rural land circulation in that they have a significantly positive relationship with the transfer out and a negative relationship with the transfer in of farmland. Knowledge and technical training for farmers may be an effective means of promoting non-agricultural employment while facilitating rural land circulation. Additionally, we found that there is frequent rural land circulation in mountainous areas, as farmers adjust their farming conditions by transferring farmland in and out.
Moderate scale management has become a current trend in agricultural management; attention should be paid to the impact of non-agricultural employment on rural land circulation, and decision makers should be aware that the increasing importance of non-agricultural income is the basis for farmers’ land transfer-out decisions. Land transfer in the Central and Western regions still needs to be further promoted. It is noted that the decision-making around land transfer in the Central and Western regions is affected by a change in the proportion of non-agricultural labor, and development of the labor market in the Central and Western regions should be considered. The farmers’ labor market should be perfected to promote rural land circulation. While paying attention to the influence of non-agricultural income on the decision around land transfer, we should also pay attention to the influence of non-agricultural assets; it can be seen that the stability of non-agricultural employment is important in promoting land transfer. The more non-agricultural assets farmers accumulate, the more stable their engagement in non-agricultural work will be. Therefore, we should speed up the construction of the labor market, increase vocational skills training, improve the rights and interests of migrant workers, and subsidize the purchase of agricultural machinery for those farmers who want to transfer in farmland to ensure the stability of farmers' non-agricultural employment and promote orderly land transfer. However, we should pay attention to the regional differences in rural land circulation and to rural land circulation in the mountainous areas and promote greater circulation in the plain areas to form large-scale operations. Further research should be conducted to find suitable regions for large-scale operations in the plain areas, and measures should be taken to adjust the employment structure to absorb more of the rural labor force in cities and promote moderate scale management in rural areas. This study provides a theoretical reference for policies affecting agricultural and migrant workers in China.
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